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Abstract 
 
This paper will provide an overview of the available evidence on psychological misconceptions, 
including key findings, current directions and emerging issues for investigation. We begin by 
defining misconceptions and then examine their prevalence and persistence, discuss their 
implications for student learning and highlight potential strategies to eliminate or reduce their 
influence. Thereafter, several theoretical and methodological issues that have traditionally 
defined research in this area are discussed. In particular, we highlight the possibility that reported 
rates of misconceptions may in part be driven by particular features of the measurement 
procedures employed. On the basis of this analysis, potential avenues for future research are 
outlined. 
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Misconceptions about Psychological Science: A Review  
Those students who come equipped to their studies with accurate pre-existing knowledge 
demonstrate greater understanding and retention of new information compared to those who 
harbor inaccurate or incomplete knowledge (e.g. Beier & Ackerman, 2005; Dochy, Segers, & 
Buehl, 1999; Thompson & Zamboanga, 2004). Moreover, students who endorse disciplinary-
inconsistent knowledge and beliefs often find their learning of new concepts impaired (Dochy, 
Segers & Buehl, 1999). Unfortunately, prior to setting foot in the classroom, many students 
already hold a spectrum of incorrect preconceptions about the core ideas and concepts relevant to 
their field of study - whether it is biology (e.g. Nehm, & Reilly, 2007), physics (Hein, 1999), or 
chemistry (Stefani, & Tsaparlis, 2009). Psychology is no exception to this phenomenon.  
Misconceptions about psychological issues, such as “Human memory works like a tape 
recorder or video camera”, “Handwriting can reveal our personality traits” and “People with 
schizophrenia have multiple personalities” are widespread and often difficult to eliminate 
(Kowalski & Taylor, 2009; Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & Beyerstein, 2009). Although 
misconceptions decrease as the number of psychology courses taken increases, upper level 
undergraduates still uncritically accept as true a large variety of erroneous claims despite their 
training in the core concepts of the discipline (Glass, Bartels, Ryan & Stark-Wroblewski, 2008; 
Standing & Huber, 2003). This is a cause for concern given that misconceptions are suggested to 
relate to academic performance (Kuhle, Barber & Bristol, 2009; McCutcheon, 1991) as well as 
critical thinking ability (Kowalski & Taylor, 2004). In this paper we provide the reader with an 
overview of misconceptions about psychological science. We begin by defining misconceptions 
and discuss their various properties. We then examine their prevalence, their implications for 
student learning and various strategies for combating their influence. Several theoretical and 
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methodological issues that have traditionally guided researchers in this area will also be 
evaluated. Finally, we highlight future work that may promote a better understanding of the 
factors that give rise to and propagate persistent misconceptions affecting our discipline. 
What Are Psychological Misconceptions? 
Different authors have employed a variety of nomenclatures, each based on a different set 
of assumptions about the nature and properties of discipline-inconsistent prior knowledge. 
Examples include preconceptions (Morrison, & Lederman, 2003), personal epistemologies 
(Hammer & Elby, 2002), alternative conceptions (Piquette, & Heikkinen, 2005), and naïve 
science (Pine, Messer & St. John, 2001). Nevertheless, “misconception” is the most frequently 
used term to describe knowledge and beliefs that are incongruent with the core concepts and 
empirical findings of a discipline (e.g. Hamza, & Wickman, 2008; Taylor & Kowalski, 2004; 
Thompson & Zamboanga, 2004). With respect to psychology, statements such as “People only 
use 10% of their brain”, “Most mentally ill people are violent” and “Responses to inkblots tell us 
a great deal about our personalities” are frequently affirmed despite a lack of empirical support 
for these claims (Phelen, Link, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 2000; Higbee & Clay, 1998; Lenz, Ek, & 
Mills, 2009). Other inaccuracies deeply ingrained in ‘folk wisdom’, such as “a full moon causes 
strange or criminal behavior”, “opposites attract” or that “it is better to express anger than hold it 
in”, are also seemingly endorsed by many (Brown, 1983; McCutcheon, 1991; Owens & 
McGowan, 2006) (see Table 1 for an overview of ten popular misconceptions about 
psychological science).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 Here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Misconceptions appear to stem from a variety of sources and may be broadly categorized 
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into two groups. On the one hand, we define factual misconceptions as beliefs that arise from 
incorrect or incomplete information encountered in the popular media, classroom or the everyday 
environment. Claims such as “Some people are left-brained, while others are right-brained”, 
“The polygraph test can accurately detect dishonesty” and “Intelligence tests are biased against 
certain groups” are more likely to be derived from sources external to the individual rather than 
their own personal experiences. On the other hand, we defined ontological misconceptions as 
those that reflect naïve or commonsense theories about thought, feelings and behavior. Consider, 
for example, the emission theory of vision, the mistaken notion that people see by emitting, from 
their eyes, rays that reflect off objects. This notion is often affirmed by young children (Cottrell 
& Winer, 1994) as well as college students (Winer, Cottrell, Karefilaki, & Gregg, 1996), 
stretches all the way back to the ancient Greeks (Gross, 1999) and continues to influence cultural 
beliefs around the world (see Winer, Rader, & Cottrell, 2003). While certainly influenced by the 
wider social context, it may be the case that this misconception (among others) is rooted in an 
underlying naïve ontology that differs dramatically from contemporary theory and research (i.e., 
that the eye detects rather than emits photons). In other words, several misconceptions may 
represent the outcome of a collection of ontological assumptions, explanatory concepts, and 
causal mechanisms that, when taken together, form the basis of intuitive theories about 
psychology (see Amsel, Baird, & Ashley, 2011). For instance, the common belief in mind-body 
dualism (see Bloom, 2004) may propagate a variety of misconceptions surrounding extrasensory 
perception, memories of previous lives and “out-of-body experiences” (Lilienfeld et al., 2009). 
Therefore, in the same way that people may harbor commonsense theories of motion (Reiner, 
Slotta, Chi, & Resnick, 2000), or about life (Carey, 1985) it is also possible for misconceptions 
to be rooted in intuitive theories about the mind, cognitive illusions (Pohl, 2004), or even 
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heuristics (Schick & Vaughn, 2010). As we shall see later, this distinction between factual and 
ontological misconceptions may be an important one, especially when it comes to developing 
strategies to undermine or eliminate them.    
Regardless of the type of misconception involved, three questions have largely guided 
empirical and theoretical work in this research area. First, a majority of studies have attempted to 
document how prevalent misconceptions are in both psychology students and the wider 
population. Second, in light of their apparent resistance to extinction, the potential implications 
of holding misconceptions for academic outcomes and critical thinking development has 
increasingly been explored. Finally, given that misconceptions are responsive to correction when 
certain conditions are met, a number of theoretical accounts have been offered to explain when 
and why this change occurs. In the following sections, we provide a brief review of the relevant 
literature for each of these three questions. 
Prevalence and Origins of Psychological Misconceptions  
The study of psychological misconceptions has constituted a recognizable research 
enterprise for more than 80 years now, with the general public (Furnham, Callahan & Rawles, 
2003; Green, Page, Rasekhy, Johnson & Bernhardt, 2006), educators (Gardner & Hund, 1983), 
undergraduate and graduate students each found to harbor a number of inaccurate beliefs about 
the discipline and its subject matter (Arntzen, Lokke, Lokke, & Eilertsen, 2010; Vaughan, 1977). 
Research has predominantly focused on undergraduate (introductory) students whose 
endorsement of misconceptions has been found to vary from 28% to 71% agreement across 
studies (see Lilienfeld et al., 2009). Such large variations may in part reflect sampling 
differences (Kuhle et al., 2009), as well as methodological issues surrounding the measurement 
procedures employed in this area (Brown, 1983; Griggs & Ransdell, 1987; Hughes, Lyddy & 
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Kaplan, in press). At the same time, student endorsement of misconceptions also differs with the 
amount of disciplinary training they have received (Gardner & Dalsing, 1986; Lamal, 1979), and 
their critical thinking ability (Kowalski & Taylor, 2004). That said, misconceptions appear to 
reflect a genuine and general phenomenon concerning core beliefs about the discipline (e.g., 
“research conducted in controlled laboratory settings is not essential for understanding everyday 
behaviour”) as well as specific disciplinary information (e.g. “The polygraph test is an accurate 
detector of lies”). 
Although much work has focused on the prevalence of psychological misconceptions, 
less attention has been devoted to understanding how people come to acquire and develop them. 
Several authors suggest that misconceptions stem from exposure to inaccurate information 
reinforced in the popular media, or instruction and textbooks that present an oversimplification 
of concepts (e.g. Stanovich, 2009). For instance, Taylor and Kowalski (2004) found that students 
attribute 20% of their misconceptions to the media, 19% to personal experience, 16% to reading, 
and 15% to classroom learning (see also Higbee & Clay, 1998). Similarly, 38% of students 
reported that their misconceptions emerged directly as a result of one of their psychology courses 
or instructors (Landau & Bavaria, 2003). While potentially informative, the reliability of these 
self-reported “sources of misconceptions” will nevertheless need to be addressed in further 
detail.  
Misconceptions have also been argued to reflect the operation of cognitive biases such as 
confirmatory bias, illusory correlations, a tendency to infer causation from correlation, post hoc 
ergo propter hoc reasoning, as well as exposure to selective samples (see Lilienfeld et al., 2009; 
Schick & Vaughn, 2010). Still others argue that misconceptions do not reflect inaccurate or 
incomplete prior beliefs but rather a core set of explanatory concepts that people use to 
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understand, predict and influence behavior (termed folk psychology; e.g., see Amsel et al., 2011). 
The type of misconception, as discussed above, is likely to be important here. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that these environmental and cognitive factors have generally been supported 
more by argument than empirical evidence (e.g. Chew, 2006). Consequently, future work will 
need to systematically examine their independent and/or combined role in the formation and 
persistence of misconceptions. Such an analysis would serve to strengthen existing claims about 
the origin of misconceptions, and aid the development of teaching techniques that intend to 
prevent or combat their influence. 
Persistence of Psychological Misconceptions and their Implications for Learning 
Misconceptions are argued to pose a challenge to educators for three reasons. First, they 
appear to be highly resistant to extinction, with standard instructional strategies (i.e. presenting 
information supported by evidence with the assumption that students will critically evaluate that 
material) insufficient to effectively combat them. Exposure to an introductory psychology course 
– or even a number of courses – has been found to reduce several misconceptions but fails to 
eliminate many others (McKeachie, 1960; Gregg, Winer, Cottrell, Hedman, & Fournier, 2001; 
Lamal, 1995; Landau & Bavaria, 2003). For instance, 30% of students who have completed 
several psychology courses still agree that someone experiencing schizophrenia has a “split 
personality” (Gardner & Dalsing, 1986) and that “most people only use 10% of their potential 
brain power” (Higbee & Clay, 1998). Therefore it appears that students come to their studies 
with a variety of misconceptions, and often leave with many of them intact. Moreover, providing 
factual knowledge with the expectation that students will critically evaluate psychological claims 
appears to be inadequate for correcting discipline-inconsistent beliefs. 
Second, not only are misconceptions resistant to normal teaching practices, they have 
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also been suggested to impact negatively on the learning of new information. Note, however, that 
this assumption has largely been driven by theoretical conjecture (e.g. Chew, 2006; Hammer, 
1996; Posner, Strike, Hewson & Gertzog, 1982) with research yielding less than conclusive 
findings in this respect. On the one hand, misconception endorsement has been found to correlate 
with actual and self-reported academic performance (e.g. Amsel et al., 2009; Kuhle et al., 2009; 
McCutcheon, 1991), and higher performing students are also more likely to relinquish 
misconceptions following instruction relative to their low performing counterparts (Gutman, 
1979). On the other hand, a number of studies have failed to obtain any direct or conclusive 
relationship between academic performance and susceptibility to misconceptions when other 
variables such as disciplinary training, cumulative attendance (Thompson & Zamboanga, 2004), 
or homework scores (Kowalski & Taylor, 2004) are explicitly controlled for (see also Best, 
1982; Vaughan 1977). Clearly, further work is needed to separate out the unique contribution of 
misconceptions from other relevant variables in determining whether and in what way they affect 
learning.  
Finally, a tendency to affirm misconceptions may signal the need for additional critical 
thinking training. The term ‘critical thinking’ can be defined in a variety of ways and can be used 
to refer to a number of related skills. Halpern (2007) defines critical thinking as “thinking that is 
purposeful, reasoned and goal directed – the kind of thinking involved in solving problems, 
formulating inferences, calculating likelihoods, and making decisions” (p.6). Here, we refer to 
critical thinking broadly as the disposition and ability to retrieve and use information to evaluate 
knowledge claims with the goal of generating sound conclusions from that information in a 
trans-contextual fashion (also see Fischer & Spiker, 2000; Sternberg, Roediger & Halpern, 
2007). It includes the tendency to question whether there is evidence to support a particular 
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claim. The development of a disposition for and success in applying critical thinking may be 
crucial for students, given that it appears to serve as predictor for academic success as well as 
misconception endorsement . For instance, students who demonstrate sophisticated critical 
thinking are - all things being equal - more likely to attain better grades than their counterparts 
with less sophisticated critical thinking skills, while students who attain good grades are also 
more likely to improve their critical thinking abilities relative to those who perform less well 
(Williams, Oliver, Allin, Winn & Booher, 2003; Williams, Oliver, Stockdale, 2004). Moreover, 
students who actively employ critical thinking skills to evaluate newly encountered information 
also appear to be less susceptible to misconceptions about the discipline (Kowalski & Taylor, 
2004). As we shall see in the next section, however, caution must be exercised when inferring a 
causal link between academic performance, critical thinking and misconception endorsement, 
especially in the absence of experimental or intervention studies that directly manipulate the 
latter two variables.  
Correcting Misconceptions about Psychological Science 
Teaching Strategies. Given that misconceptions often persist in the face of standard 
instruction and may hinder student learning, a key question concerns how to combat them. Initial 
work has focused on the roles of source monitoring (i.e., asking students to carefully scrutinize 
the sources of their misconceptions; Landau & Bavaria, 2003), refutational teaching strategies 
and critical thinking (Kowalski & Taylor, 2004; McCutcheon, 1992). Consider teaching 
strategies: although misconceptions are often resistant to correction via standard instruction, 
refutational readings (Guzzetti, 2000), essays (Miller, Wozniak, Rust, Miller & Slezak, 1996), 
lectures or some combination of the three (Kowalski & Taylor, 2009) have met with success in 
eliminating them. In each case, a misconception is first highlighted and then directly refuted 
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using empirical evidence. Vaughan (1977) found that although the introductory course had only 
a minimal impact upon student misconceptions (6.5% reduction), erroneous beliefs that did 
change were those that had been directly refuted during the course. Likewise, when the 
effectiveness of refutational text and lectures was compared to a standard lecture and text 
combination (or no coverage of the misconceptions at all), the refutational approach was superior 
in dispelling these beliefs (Kowalski & Taylor, 2009). Moreover, refutational lectures alone 
produced a significant reduction in misconceptions above and beyond that contributed by the 
refutational text (see also Miller et al., 1996).        
In short, this preliminary work highlights that psychology instructors should tailor their 
teaching strategies towards (a) explicitly identifying misconceptions to their students and then 
(b) directly refuting them through either lectures and/or readings. At the same time, alternative 
teaching techniques may also provide a means for correcting student misunderstandings. Mazur 
(1997) developed a teaching tool termed ConcepTest as a means to activate and then correct 
misconceptions using a multiple-choice format (see Chew, 2004 for its application to 
psychology). Amsel (2009) argues for the need to go beyond knowledge transmission in teaching 
psychology and advocates meta-instruction - teaching that aims to convey psychology’s beliefs 
and values and to transform the students’ identity as future members of the scientific community.  
Critical Thinking. Although little work has investigated the interaction between 
misconceptions, academic performance and critical thinking, the latter variable may play a role 
in reducing inaccurate beliefs. Consider the work of McCutcheon and colleagues (1992) who 
found that while both course grades and critical thinking independently predicted misconception 
endorsement, critical thinking was a significantly better predictor. Likewise, Kowalski and 
Taylor (2004) found no relation between students’ academic performance and susceptibility to 
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misconceptions prior to an introductory psychology course, suggesting that both high and low 
performing students arrive at the discipline with misunderstandings about its core concepts. 
Following the course, however, significant correlations were observed between course grades, 
critical thinking ability and changes in misconceptions, with the effect of academic performance 
moderated by its relation to critical thinking. Irrespective of academic performance, those 
students who actively employ critical thinking skills to evaluate newly encountered information 
were less susceptible to misconceptions. Importantly, these findings may also clarify the 
ambiguous relationship between academic performance and misconception endorsement noted 
previously. In other words, both variables could be moderated by a third factor that was 
uncontrolled for in the aforementioned studies (i.e. critical thinking). To examine this issue 
further, future research could examine whether training aimed at improving critical thinking 
results in similar reductions in misconceptions for both low and high performing students (see 
Abrami et al., 2008). Similarly, little work has directly compared whether generic versus subject-
specific critical thinking is a better predictor of academic performance and misconception 
endorsement. For instance, will students who are specifically trained to think skeptically about 
psychological theory and research also apply those skills to other intellectual domains and 
everyday life (e.g., when evaluating advertisements, political propaganda or new medicines)?  
Temporary or Permanent Changes in Misconceptions? 
Although misconceptions may be successfully eliminated, the possibility remains that 
any such change may only be temporary in nature. Consistent with this notion, Winer and 
colleagues (2002) reviewed a series of studies on the emission theory of vision. Although a 
highly simplified lecture on vision containing refutational statements reduced erroneous beliefs, 
those same mistaken beliefs re-emerged five months later (see also Landau & Bavaria, 2003). 
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This may be an important issue given that many - if not most - misconception studies have 
employed either a single test or a pre-post design to probe for changes immediately following a 
course or manipulation. When such a strategy is adopted, researchers and educators alike may 
inadvertently view misconceptions as being successfully eliminated. Yet it is possible that a 
‘rebound effect’ may occur whereby inaccuracies addressed within a single class or course are 
temporarily reduced but nevertheless re-emerge once course content moves on to other areas 
(Lyddy & Hughes, 2012). Put differently, when researchers introduce a manipulation to reduce 
misconceptions, and then test the effectiveness of that manipulation within a single class or 
course it is not possible to know with certainty that misconceptions have truly been eliminated 
across time and context. Consequently, future research will need to adopt a longitudinal 
assessment of misconceptions to ascertain the degree and duration of change long after the 
course has ended. It should also be noted that the majority of research in this area has focused 
solely on undergraduate (introductory) psychology students. A detailed picture of the prevalence 
and transmission of misconceptions at all levels of the discipline will only emerge by directing 
attention towards graduate students and university level educators as well as introductory or 
advanced undergraduates. 
Methodological Issues in the Study of Psychological Misconceptions 
As highlighted previously, the degree to which people purportedly fall prey to 
psychological misconceptions varies significantly from study to study. These large variations 
could reflect methodological issues surrounding the procedures commonly employed in this 
research domain (Brown, 1984; Griggs and Ransdell, 1987; Ruble, 1986; Taylor and Kowalski, 
2004). Specifically, although numerous techniques have been devised to measure 
misconceptions, including computerized assessment (Gregg et al., 2001), interviews (Hamza & 
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Wickman, 2008), open-ended questions (Klymkowsky & Garvin-Doxas, 2008) and concept-
mapping (Liu, Lin, & Tsia, 2009), psychological research has almost exclusively relied on self-
report questionnaires. More often than not this involves participants registering their 
(dis)agreement with a series of statements using a dichotomous true/false response format. 
Recently, however, many of these questionnaires have come under criticism due to the ambiguity 
of test items and response format used. 
One criticism concerns the ambiguity or lack of precision associated with certain test 
items, such that participants may interpret the same question in different ways. Where this is the 
case, misconception questionnaires may be subject to response biases above and beyond the 
application of faulty beliefs and knowledge. For illustration purposes, consider the following 
claim: “Most people use only 10% of their potential brain power”. When phrased in this manner 
as many as 77% of students agree with this statement (Landua & Bavaria, 2003). Yet when asked 
“what percentage of their potential brain power do you think most people use” and given 21 
different choices ranging from 0% to 100%, acceptance of the ten-percent myth varies from 5 to 
90% (Higbee & Clay, 1998). Indeed, the difficulty with devising a list of specific and 
unambiguous erroneous statements has been noted throughout the literature. Griggs and Ransdell 
(1987) conducted a review of several studies assessing psychological misconceptions and 
identified 21 items that were consistently employed across studies despite concerns about their 
ambiguity.  
A second methodological criticism surrounds the response format typically employed in 
misconception questionnaires. Given the complexity of psychological phenomenon and the fact 
that empirical findings are often subject to further qualification, restricting responses to “true” or 
“false” may be problematic for two reasons. On the one hand, many misconceptions may be 
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partially incorrect but not entirely false. They may contain a ‘kernel of truth’ or be true some of 
the time, but not generally. Consider the notion that “Opposites attract”. Although small 
differences between romantic partners may contribute to a more interesting and varied 
relationship, we typically select mates that are similar to ourselves in personality, attitudes and 
values (e.g. Buston & Emlen, 2003; Hitsch, Hortaçsu & Ariely, 2009). Gardner and Hund (1983) 
found that when they asked (non)social science faculty to register their (dis)agreement with a 
series of statements using a five point scale, the majority of misconceptions were rated as 
“mostly false” rather than “completely false”, and several misconceptions as “partly false” or 
“partly true”. On the other hand, it may also be the case that the True/False format fails to 
distinguish between strongly held misconceptions and responses due to uncertainty or guessing. 
For instance, including an ‘I don’t know/no opinion’ option in a 60 item True-False 
misconception questionnaire resulted in students reporting uncertainty for 12% of responses 
(Gardner & Dalsing, 1986).  
To circumvent these problems, multiple choice scales have increasingly been used to 
sensitively discriminate the direction and relative strength of the belief, as well as to register 
responses due to uncertainty or guessing (e.g. Assanand, Pinel, Lehman, 1998; McCutcheon, 
1991; Thompson & Zombonga, 2004). Others have also argued for the inclusion of procedures 
that capture how confident students are in their misconceptions. Taylor and Kowalski (2004) 
constructed a 48-item true/false questionnaire but also included a 1-10 confidence scale in order 
to assess the strength of students’ prior beliefs. Following an introductory course (employing a 
refutational format), correct identification of misconceptions nearly doubled. In addition, rated 
confidence for accurate beliefs increased whereas confidence for misconceptions that students 
still endorsed decreased. This suggests that confidence ratings may provide an index of 
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misconceptions that are retained but are in the process of changing. If this is the case, then 
inaccurate beliefs may change in degree rather than kind. Although admittedly speculative, 
misconception correction may be a gradual developmental process rather than a sudden and 
revolutionary one.  
To conclude, an accurate and sensitive index of psychological misconceptions and their 
change requires that the procedures used to do so are subject to careful scrutiny. Future work will 
need to determine whether the language and structure of self-report questionnaires affects the 
degree to which students affirm misconceptions. Doing so would serve to identify differences in 
misconceptions that arise not from the application of faulty knowledge and beliefs but as a result 
of the outcome measure employed (see Hughes et al., in press for preliminary work in this vein). 
Consequently, we suggest that researchers or educators interested in constructing and deploying 
self-report procedures to index misconceptions should specify the source of their test items as 
well as rationale for item-phrasing and inclusion. This will enable others to identify 
questionnaires that provide an accurate and reliable measure of misconceptions as well as a 
means for choosing between different tools. At the same time, there is a clear need to ascertain 
the utility of alternative procedures above and beyond self-report questionnaires. Future work 
could import novel procedures from other disciplines (e.g., computerized assessment, interviews 
and open-ended questions) and compare performance on these tasks against existing 
questionnaires. Adopting such a strategy would help educators to better identify legitimate 
methods of assessing their students’ knowledge and beliefs. Finally, the potential influence of 
demand compliance or self-presentation effects may also require attention given that participants 
may be alerted to the fact that the questionnaires are about popular misconceptions and thus 
alter their responding accordingly. Indeed, highly experienced participants (such as those in later 
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years of their studies) may be more aware of this possibility than their less experienced 
counterparts. Although several authors have included filler items to mask their intended 
manipulation (e.g., Kowalski & Taylor, 2009) the majority of studies have not. Consequently, it 
remains to be seen whether systematically altering the presence versus absence of filler items or 
even cover stories will influence performance on such tasks.  
Theoretical Models for Correcting Misconceptions 
To date, a number of theoretical accounts have been offered to explain (a) how 
misconceptions should be conceptualized; (b) why they are resistant to correction; and (c) the 
necessary conditions for successful learning. More often than not these models have focused on 
ontological misconceptions and defined them in terms of cognitive concepts such as schemas 
(Chi, 2008), representations (Reif 1995), procedural knowledge (Booth, & Koedinger, 2008) and 
epistemologies (Hammer & Elby, 2002). At present, conceptual change represents the dominant 
theoretical account in the literature (e.g. Limón & Mason, 2002; Posner et al., 1982; Vosniadou, 
2008). Within this perspective, the precise conceptualization of “conceptual change” varies from 
model to model. For example, Vosnaidou, (2008) argues that misconceptions are a product of 
well-established ontological assumptions, concepts, and causal mechanisms that people use to 
formulate an intuitive or “naive” theory of human behavior. They are not unitary, faulty and 
static conceptions but the outcome of an inter-related body of knowledge that is “dynamic, 
situated, and constantly changing in response to contextual variables” (p.279). Naïve theories are 
employed and reinforced continuously through interaction with the lay culture making 
misconceptions resistant to quick or easy revision. Alternatively, Chi and Roscoe (2002) view 
misconceptions as the ontological mis-categorization of concepts and conceptual change as the 
repair (or reassignment) of incorrect concepts to their correct categories. In a similar fashion, di 
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Sessa (2002) defines conceptual change as the process of cognitively integrating and re-
organizing fragmented naive knowledge into a structured cognitive system. Finally, Ivarsson and 
colleagues’ (2002) sociocultural model treats misconceptions as the byproduct of a lack of 
discipline-specific training in the appropriate use of its "intellectual tools" (i.e. agreed upon 
concepts as well as means of communicating). Conceptual change involves the gradual 
socialization into and effective use of the intellectual tools of the discipline (see Mayer, 2002; 
Sinatra, 2002 for discussion of the above models). 
Although the aforementioned models differ in their approach to conceptual change, they 
each share one common assumption: misconceptions can only be corrected by revising or 
restructuring currently held inaccurate beliefs towards disciplinary consistent knowledge. When 
prior knowledge and beliefs are consistent with new information, learning is facilitated. 
However, when prior knowledge and beliefs contradict newly acquired information learning is 
impaired. Therefore successful learning results only when students critically evaluate previously 
held beliefs as well as revise and replace them with new and disciplinary consistent information. 
Given that it is easier for people to ignore, reinterpret, or reject new information rather than to 
revise their existing beliefs, conceptual change requires four conditions to be met: (1) students 
must be motivated (i.e. dissatisfied with their prior belief); (2) the alternative explanatory 
concept must be intelligible (meaningful and non-contradictory); (3) the alternative concept must 
be plausible (believable to the student); and (4) the alternative concept must be useful (aids the 
student in solving problems) (see Treagust & Duit, 2008). This “re-evaluation” process is 
assumed to occur when teaching purposefully “activates” prior knowledge and then creates a 
cognitive conflict between that knowledge and the information to be learned.  
In contrast to their ontological counterparts, factual misconceptions may not require that 
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a rich network of assumptions, explanatory concepts and causal mechanisms be examined, 
modified and restructured. Rather, and as noted in the introduction, these inaccuracies usually 
reflect faulty or incorrect information contacted through exposure to the media and popular 
culture. Consequently, correcting claims such as “People with schizophrenia have multiple 
personalities”, “Playing Mozart to babies increases their intelligence” or “There has recently 
been a massive epidemic of infantile autism” may not involve conceptual change – at least as 
defined above. Instead, factual misconceptions may be undermined or even eliminated via 
refutational teaching practices that alert students to their mistaken beliefs while providing 
relevant, accurate information about the topic of concern. In doing so, these techniques may 
create a “cognitive conflict” between the old and new knowledge, while also providing coherent 
and credible accounts for the student to adopt. A revision of the misconception may subsequently 
take place when the student is dissatisfied with their prior belief and the newly presented 
information is construed as intelligible, plausible, and useful (see Kowalski & Taylor, 2009 for 
preliminary evidence in this vein).  
Despite a wealth of theoretical work in this area, several questions need to be addressed. 
First, contemporary research on conceptual change and its mediating role in the reduction of 
misconceptions has largely been correlational in nature. Further insight into the causal role of 
conceptual change in misconception revision awaits research that (a) clearly operationalizes this 
construct and (b) demonstrates that indirectly manipulating this variable produces concomitant 
changes in misconceptions. At the same time, future research will also need to determine 
whether carving misconceptions into factual and ontological varieties has useful implications for 
educational researchers and instructors alike. For example, are the strategies necessary for 
undermining factual misconceptions also successful in targeting ontological misconceptions? Is 
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it the case that changes in misconceptions reflect the ability to skeptically evaluate and modify 
naïve theories of psychology or simply the capacity to answer specific questions that have been 
directly instructed during a course?  
Conclusion 
Students do not arrive to the study of psychological science as blank slates but rather 
come equipped with varying amounts of (inaccurate) knowledge and beliefs. Although the 
reported prevalence of misconceptions about psychology is subject to large variation across 
studies, these inaccuracies appear to reflect a genuine, replicable and general phenomenon. 
Several authors have theorized that these erroneous beliefs have negative consequences for 
student learning - however there is no conclusive agreement on this issue to date. Nevertheless, 
misconceptions appear highly resistant to standard classroom instruction such that many students 
may leave both introductory and more advanced psychology courses equipped with a host of 
inaccurate beliefs. Although difficult to change, misconceptions can be corrected when 
instructors highlight not only what is correct or empirically verified, but also what is incorrect 
and empirically unsupported.  
Documenting how readily students affirm inaccuracies about the discipline constitutes a 
necessary first step - but only a first step. A more detailed picture will only emerge by addressing 
whether and why misconceptions constitute a serious impediment for critical thinking or learning 
more generally. Likewise, are misconceptions present at all levels of the discipline (e.g. graduate 
students and faculty members) and are they moderated by cultural factors? Is the tendency to 
affirm misconceptions trans-contextual such that those students who readily affirm psychological 
misconceptions are also more likely to agree with erroneous medical, consumer or political 
claims? Although refutation instruction has met with success in dispelling misconceptions, what 
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impact would a critical thinking course, that explicitly equips students with a set of intellectual 
tools, have for rejecting erroneous claims? In answering these and related questions, future work 
will need to pay careful attention to methodological issues surrounding core properties of 
misconception questionnaires. Only by doing so will we identify the factors responsible for 
shaping, maintaining and extinguishing misconceptions about our discipline.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Running Head: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY  22 
References 
 
Abrami, P. C., Bernard R. M., Borokhovski E., Wadem A., Surkes M. A., Tamim R., Zhang D. 
(2008). Instructional interventions affecting critical thinking skills and dispositions: a stage 
1 meta-analysis. Review of Educational Research, 78, 1102–1134. 
Amsel, E., Baird, T., & Ashley, A. (2011).  Misconceptions and conceptual change in 
undergraduate students learning psychology. Psychology Learning and Teaching, 10(1), 3-
10. 
Amsel, E., Johnston, A., Alvarado, E., Kettering, J., Rankin, R., & Ward, M. (2009). The effect 
of perspective on misconceptions in psychology: A test of conceptual change theory. 
Journal of Instructional Psychology, 36(4), 289-295. 
Amsel, E. (2009). Teaching psychology students to think like psychologists.  Proceedings of the 
Fifth Annual Science Education at the Crossroads Conference, Sept. 20-22, 2009.  
Retrieved March 1
st
 2010 from 
http://faculty.weber.edu/eamsel/Research/Papers/Crossroads%202009.pdf 
Arntzen, E., Lokke, J., Lokke, Gunn, Eilertsen, D. E. (2010). On misconceptions about
 behaviour analysis among university students and teachers. The Psychological
 Record, 60(2), 325-336. 
Assanand, S., Pinel, J. P., & Lehman, D.  R. (1998). Teaching theories of hunger and 
eating: Overcoming students' misconceptions. Teaching of Psychology, 25(1), 44. 
Beier, M. E., Ackerman, P. L. (2005). Age, ability, and the role of prior knowledge on the 
acquisition of new domain knowledge: Promising results in a real-world learning 
environment. Psychology and Aging, 20, 341–355. 
Best. J. B. (1982). Misconceptions about psychology among students who perform highly. 
Running Head: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY  23 
Psychological Reports, 51, 239-244. 
Bloom, P. (2004). Descartes’ baby. New York: Basic Books. 
Booth, J. L., & Koedinger, K. R. (2008). Key misconceptions in algebraic problem solving. In 
B.C. Love, K. McRae, & V. M. Sloutsky (Eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 571-576). 
Brown, L. T. (1983). Some more misconceptions about psychology among introductory 
psychology students. Teaching of Psychology, 10, 207-210. 
Brown, L.T. (1984). Misconceptions about psychology aren’t always what they seem. Teaching 
in Psychology, 11, 75-78. 
Buston, P. M., & Emlen, S. T. (2003). Cognitive processes underlying human mate choice: the 
relationship between self-perception and mate preference in Western society. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, 100, 8805–8810. doi:10.1073/pnas.1533220100 
Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chew, S. L. (2004). Student misconceptions in the psychology classroom. Essays from 
Excellence in Teaching, Vol. 4. Retrieved August 16, 2012, from http:/teachpsych.org/ 
resources/e-books/eit2004/eit04-03.pdf. 
Chew, S. L. (2006). Seldom in doubt but often wrong: Addressing tenacious student 
misconceptions. In D. S. Dunn & S. L. Chew (Eds.), Best practices for teaching 
introduction to psychology (pp. 211-223). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Chi, M.T.H. (2008). Three types of conceptual change: Belief revision, mental model 
transformation, and categorical shift. In S. Vosniadou (Ed.): Handbook of research on 
conceptual change. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Chi, M.T.H., & Roscoe, R.D. (2002). The process and challenges of conceptual change. In 
Running Head: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY  24 
Limon M. and Mason, L. (Eds.). Reconsidering Conceptual Change: Issues in Theory and 
Practice, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic. 
Cottrell, J. E., & Winer, G. A. (1994). Development in the understanding of perception: The 
decline of extramission perception beliefs. Developmental Psychology, 30, 218–228. 
DiSessa, A. A. (2006). A history of conceptual change research. In K. R. Sawyer (Ed.), The 
Cambridge handbook of the learning sciences (pp. 265 – 281). Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press. 
DiSessa, A. A. (2002). Why conceptual ecology is a good idea. In Limon M. & Mason, L. (Eds.). 
Reconsidering Conceptual Change: Issues in Theory and Practice (p. 29–60). The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic. 
Dole, J. A. & Sinatra, G. M. (1998). Reconceptualising change in the cognitive construction of 
knowledge. Educational Psychologist, 33, 109-128. 
Dochy, F., Segers, M., & Buehl, M. M. (1999). The relation between assessment practices and 
outcomes of studies: The case of research on prior knowledge. Review of Educational 
Research, 69(2), 145–186. 
Duit, R., & Treagust, D. F. (2003). Conceptual change: A powerful framework for improving 
science teaching and learning. International Journal of Science Education, 25, 671 – 688. 
Fischer, S. C., & Spiker, V. A. (2000). A framework for critical thinking research and training. 
Report prepared for the US Army Research Institute. Santa Barbara, California: Anacapa 
Sciences Inc. 
Furnham, A., Callahan, I., & Rawles, R. (2003). Adults’ knowledge of general 
psychology. European Psychologist, 8, 101–116. 
Gardner, R. M., & Dalsing, S. (1986). Misconceptions about psychology among college students. 
Running Head: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY  25 
Teaching of Psychology, 13, 32-34. 
Gardner, R. M., & Hund, R. M. (1983). Misconceptions of psychology among academicians. 
Teaching of Psychology, 10, 20-22.   
Glass, L., Bartels, J., Ryan, J., & Stark-Wroblewski, K. (2008). The effectiveness of psychology 
 courses at discontinuing common psychological myths. Individual Differences Research, 
 6(2), 97-103. 
Green, J. P., Page, R. A., Rasekhy, R., Johnson, L. K., & Bernhardt, S. E. (2006). Cultural views 
and attitudes about hypnosis: A survey of college students across four countries. 
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 54, 263-280. 
Gregg, V. R., Winer, G. A., Cottrell, J. E., Hedman, K. E., & Fournier, J. S. (2001). The 
persistence of a misconception about vision after educational interventions. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 8, 622-626. 
Griggs, R. A., & Ransdell, S. E. (1987). Misconceptions tests or misconceived tests? Teaching of 
Psychology, 14, 210-214. 
Gross, C. G.  (1999). The fire that comes from the eye. The Neuroscientist, 5, 58-64. 
Gutman, A. (1979). Misconceptions of psychology and performance in the introductory course. 
Teaching in Psychology, 6, 159-161. 
Guzzetti, B. J. (2000). Learning counter-intuitive science concepts: What have we learned from 
over a decade of research? Reading and Writing Quarterly, 16, 89–98. 
Hammer, D., & Elby, A. (2002). On the form of a personal epistemology. In B. K. Hofer & P. R. 
Pintrich (Eds.), Personal Epistemology:  The Psychology of Beliefs about Knowledge and 
Knowing (pp. 169-190). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Hammer, D. (1996). More than misconceptions: Multiple perspectives on student knowledge and 
Running Head: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY  26 
reasoning, and an appropriate role for education research. American Journal of Physics, 64, 
1316-1325. 
Hamza, K. M., & Wickman, P. (2008). Describing and analyzing learning in action: an empirical 
study of the importance of misconceptions in learning science. Science Education 92, 141-
164. 
Hein, T. L. (1999). Using writing to confront student misconceptions in physics. European 
Journal of Physics, 20, 137-141. 
Higbee, K. L., & Clay, S. L. (1998). College students' beliefs in the ten-percent myth. The 
Journal of Psychology, 132(5), 469-476. 
Hitsch, G. J., Hortacsu, A., & Ariely, D. (2010). What makes you click? Mate preferences in 
online dating. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 8, 393– 427. doi:10.1007/s11129-
010-9088-6. 
Hughes, S., Lyddy, F., & Kaplan, R. (in press). The Impact of Language and Format on Student 
Endorsement of Psychological Misconceptions. Teaching of Psychology. 
Ivarsson, J., Schoultz, J., & Säljö, R., (2002). Map Reading versus mind reading: Revisiting 
children’s understanding of the shape of the earth. In Limon, M. & Mason L. (Eds.),  
Reconsidering conceptual change: Issues in theory and practice. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Klymkowsky M. W., Garvin-Doxas, K. (2008). Recognizing student misconceptions through 
Ed's tools and the biology concept inventory. PLoS Biology, 6, 14-17. 
Kowalski, P. & Taylor, A. (2004). Ability and critical thinking as predictors of change in 
students' psychological misconceptions. Journal of Instructional Psychology, 31(4), 297-
303. 
Running Head: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY  27 
Kowalski, P., & Taylor, A. (2009). The effect of refuting misconceptions in the introductory 
psychology class. Teaching of Psychology, 36, 153-159.  
Kuhle, B. X., Barber, J. M., & Bristol, A. S. (2009). Predicting students’ performance in 
introductory psychology from their psychology misconceptions. Journal of Instructional 
Psychology, 36(2), 119-124. 
Lamal, P. A. (1995). College students' misconceptions about behavior analysis. Teaching of 
Psychology, 22, 177-179. 
Landau, J. D., & Bavaria A. J. (2003). Does deliberate source monitoring reduce students’ 
misconceptions about psychology? Teaching of Psychology, 30, 311-314. 
Lenz, M. A., Ek, K., & Mills, A. C. (2009). Misconceptions in psychology. Presentation at the 
4th Midwest Conference on Professional Psychology, Owatonna, MN. 
Lilienfeld, S. O., Lynn, S. J., Ruscio, J., & Beyerstein, B. L. (2009). Fifty great myths of popular 
psychology: Shattering widespread misconceptions about human behavior. Chichester, 
England: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Liu, T. C., Lin, Y., & Tsai, C. (2009). Identifying senior high school students’ misconceptions 
about statistical correlation, and their possible causes: An exploratory study using concept 
mapping with interviews. International Journal of Science and Mathematics Education, 
7(4), 791-820.  
Lyddy, F., & Hughes, S. (2012). Attitudes towards psychology as a science and the persistence 
of psychological misconceptions in psychology undergraduates. In V. Karandashev, & S. 
McCarthy, (Eds). Teaching Psychology around the World (Vol. 3). Newcastle upon Tyne, 
UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
Mayer, R. E. (2002).  Understanding conceptual change: A commentary. In Limon, M., & 
Running Head: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY  28 
Mason, L. (Eds.), Reconsidering conceptual change: Issues in theory and practice (pp. 
101-114). Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Mazure, E. (1997). Peer Instruction: a user’s manual. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
McCutcheon, L. E. (1991). A new test of misconceptions about psychology. Psychological 
Reports, 68, 647– 653. 
McCutcheon, L. E., Apperson, J. M., Hanson, E., & Wynn, V. (1992). Relationships among 
critical thinking skills, academic achievement, and misconceptions about psychology. 
Psychological Reports, 71, 635-639. 
McKeachie, W. J. (1960). Changes in scores on the Northwestern Misconceptions Test in six 
elementary psychology courses. Journal of Educational Psychology, 51, 240-244.      
Miller, R. L., Wozniak, W. J., Rust, M. R., Miller, B. R., & Slezak, J.  (1996). Counterattitudinal 
advocacy as a means of enhancing instructional effectiveness: How to teach students 
what they do not want to know. Teaching of Psychology, 23(4), 215-219. 
Morrison, J. A. & Lederman, N. G. (2003). Science teachers' diagnosis of understanding of 
students' preconceptions. Science Education, 87, 849-867. 
Nehm, R., & Reilly, L. (2007). Biology majors' knowledge and misconceptions of natural 
selection. BioScience, 57, 263–272. 
Owens, M., & McGowan, I. W. (2006). Madness and the Moon: The Lunar Cycle and 
Psychopathology. German Journal of Psychiatry. Retrieved August 07, 2012 from 
http://www.gjpsy.uni-goettingen.de/gjp-article-owens.pdf 
Phelan, J. C., Link, B. G., Stueve, A., & Pescosolido, B. A. (2000). Public conceptions of mental 
illness in 1950 and 1996: What is mental illness and is it to be feared? Journal of Health 
and Social Behavior, 41(2), 188–207. 
Running Head: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY  29 
Piquette, J. S., & Heikkinen, H. W. (2005). Strategies reported used by instructors to address 
student alternate conceptions in chemical equilibrium. Journal of Research in Science 
Teaching, 42, 1112-1134. 
Pine, K., Messer, D., & St. John., K. (2001). Children’s misconceptions in primary science: A 
survey of teachers’ views. Research in Science & Technological Education, 19, 79-96. 
Pohl, R. F. (Ed.). (2004). Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, 
judgment, and memory. New York: Psychology Press 
Posner, G. J., Strike, K. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accommodation of a 
scientific conception: Towards a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 66, 
211-227.  
Reif, F., (1995). Understanding and teaching important scientific thought processes. American 
Journal of Physics, 63(1), 17-32.  
Reiner, M., Slotta, J. D., Chi, M. T. H., & Resnick, L. B. (2000). Naive physics reasoning: A 
commitment to substance-based conceptions. Cognition and Instruction, 18, 1-34. 
Ruble, R. (1986). Ambiguous psychological misconceptions. Teaching of Psychology, 13, 34-36.  
Schick, T., & Vaughn, L. (2010). How to Think About Weird Things: Critical Thinking for a New 
Age. McGraw-Hill Higher Education 
Sinatra, G. M. (2002). Motivational, social, and contextual aspects of conceptual change: A 
commentary. In Limon & Mason (Eds.), Reconsidering conceptual change: Issues in 
theory and practice (pp. 187–197). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Standing, L. G., Huber, H. (2003) Do psychology courses reduce belief in psychological myths? 
Social Behavior & Personality, 31, 585-592. 
Stanovich, K. E. (2009). How to Think Straight About Psychology. Pearson Education. 
Running Head: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY  30 
Stefani, C., & Tsaparlis, G. (2009). Students’ levels of explanations, models, and misconceptions 
in basic quantum chemistry. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 46(5), 520-536. 
Sternberg, R. J., Roediger III, H. L., and Halpern, D. F. (Eds.) (2007). Critical thinking in 
psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tanner, K., & Allen, D. (2005). Approaches to biology teaching and learning: Understanding the 
wrong answers—teaching toward conceptual change. Cell Biology Education, 4, 112–117. 
Taylor, A. K., & Kowalski, P. (2004). Naive psychological science: The prevalence, strength, 
and sources of misconceptions. Psychological Record. 54, 15-25.  
Thompson, R. A., & Zamboanga, B. L. (2003). Prior knowledge and its relevance to student 
achievement in Introduction to Psychology. Teaching of Psychology, 30, 96 –101. 
Thompson, R., & Zamboanga, B. (2004). Academic aptitude and prior knowledge as predictors 
of student achievement in introduction to psychology.  Journal of Educational Psychology, 
96, 778–784. 
Tippett, C. D. (2010). Refutation text in science education: A review of two decades of research, 
International Journal of Science and Mathematics Education, 8(6), 951-970. 
Treagust, T., & Duit, R. (2008). Conceptual change: A discussion of theoretical, methodological 
and practical challenges for science education. Cultural Studies of Science Education, 3, 
297–328. 
Van Den Broek, P., & Kendeou, P. (2008). Cognitive Processes in Comprehension of Science 
Texts: The Role of Co-Activation in Confronting Misconceptions. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 22, 335–351. 
Vaughan, E. D. (1977). Misconceptions about psychology among introductory psychology 
students. Teaching of Psychology, 4, 138-141.  
Running Head: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY  31 
Vosniadou, S. (2008). International Handbook of Research on conceptual Change, Routledge. 
Williams, R. L., Oliver, R., & Stockdale, S. (2004). Psychological versus generic critical 
thinking as predictors and outcome measures in a large undergraduate human development 
course. Journal of General Education, 53(1), 37–58. 
Williams, R. L., Oliver, R., Allin, J. L., Winn, B., & Booher, C. S. (2003). Psychological critical 
thinking as a course predictor and outcome variable. Teaching of Psychology, 30, 220–223. 
Winer, G. A., Cottrell, J. E., Gregg, V., Fournier, J. S., & Bica, L. S. (2002). Fundamentally 
misunderstanding visual perception: Adults’ belief in visual emissions. American 
Psychologist, 57, 417-424. 
Winer, G. A., Cottrell, J. E., Karefilaki, K., & Gregg, V. R. (1996). Images, words and questions: 
 Variables that influence beliefs about vision in children and adults. Journal of 
 Experimental Child Psychology, 63, 499–525. 
Winer, G. A., Rader, A. W., & Cottrell, J. E. (2003). Testing different interpretations for the 
 mistaken belief that rays exit the eyes during vision. Journal of Psychology:  
 Interdisciplinary and Applied, 137(3), 243-261. 
Ziori, E., & Dienes, Z. (2008). How does prior knowledge affect implicit and explicit concept 
 learning? The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61(4), 601-624. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Running Head: MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY  32 
Table 1 
Popular psychological misconceptions endorsed by a majority of respondents 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Misconception        
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. People only use 10% of their total brain power (Della Sala, 1999; Higbee & Clay, 1998) 
2. Playing classical music to infants increases their intelligence (Bangerter & Heath, 2004) 
3. Responses on inkblot tests reveal a great deal about our personalities (Lenz et al., 2009) 
4. People with schizophrenia have multiple personalities (Stuart & Arboleda-Florez, 2001)  
5. Psychiatric hospital admissions and crimes increase during a full moon (Owens & McGowan, 2006) 
6. The polygraph test can accurately detect dishonesty (Myers, Latter & Abdollahi-Arena, 2006)  
7. Hypnosis can be used to reliably retrieve memories of forgotten events (Green et al., 2006) 
8. People can learn a new language while asleep (Brown, 1983) 
9. Some people are left-brained, others are right-brained (Lyddy & Hughes, 2012) 
10. Opposites attract: People are most romantically attracted to individuals who differ from them in their 
personality, interests, and attitudes (McCutcheon, 1991) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
